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This paper examines the way new investor led collaborative initiatives are impacting on the 
integration of ESG information into mainstream investment processes and their potential to 
influence the standard valuation and investment practices of global fund managers. The 
objective is to identify how different approaches –be it collaborative initiatives, research 
platforms or incentive systems–contribute to the evolution of conventional investment 
practices and the integration of ESG information into the long-term shareholder value of 
investee companies.  
 






ESG (Environmental, Social and Governance ) considerations have been for a long 
time the domain of the so-called ‘(Socially) Responsible Investors’, a marginal and morally 
loaded group of investors using ESG information in addition to conventional financial criteria 
in investment strategy. During the 1990’s SRI  has shifted from an activist movement to a 
commercial project [Louche, 2004] and many traditional banks and investment houses have 
started to develop socially responsible funds to capture the increasing market demand for SRI 
. Nevertheless, these developments remained marginal within the financial community and 
ESG disconnected from traditional investment activities. But during the last decade a new 
phenomenon is emerging. ESG factors seem to be entering the vocabulary of mainstream 
financial analysts and fund managers. In fact, an increasing number of analysts are declaring a 
commitment to ESG information integration into mainstream investment practices. This is 
confirmed by a number of surveys that highlight the financial community’s awareness and 
recognition of those extra-financial dimensions [McKinsey, 2009; Ambachtsheer, 2005; 
PLEON, 2005; Taylor Nelson Sofres, 2003]. The growing interest in ESG information within 
the mainstream investment community, is motivated and sustained by a number of individuals 
and institutional initiatives. Indeed, over the last few years, we have been witnessing the 
beginning of several coordinated efforts to encourage the integration of ESG into firms’ 
valuation and investment making processes such as the Enhanced Analytics Initiatives (EAI) 
and the Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI).  
This paper examines the way new investor led collaborative initiatives are impacting 
on the integration of ESG information into mainstream investment processes and their 
potential to influence the standard valuation and investment practices of global fund 
managers. The objective is to identify how different approaches –be it collaborative 
initiatives, research platforms or incentive systems–contribute to the evolution of conventional 
investment practices and the integration of ESG information into the long-term shareholder 
value of investee companies.  
The overarching research question addressed in the paper is: How do dominant 
conventions change? We argue that collective beliefs play an important role in a company’s 
stock valuation and investment strategies. More particularly, financial market participants 
coordinate their actions through dominant conventions --that is some norms of behaviour that 
determine the normality of a situation and give saliency to implementing decisions--shared 
and diffused across the market.  
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Following this logic, the integration of ESG information will become a mainstream 
practice if, and only if, there is a shared belief among investors that ESG information is 
relevant. The question is how can the dominant convention be changed? Our contention is that 
the myriad of investor-led initiatives that have emerged over the last few years to encourage 
the integration of ESG information represent endeavours towards changing the current 
dominant convention of valuing companies, (i.e. convention that does not include ESG 
information into company valuation). Indeed, these initiatives are helping to build 
mechanisms through which a change in the prevailing collective belief could occur. Building 
on DiMaggio and Powell [1983]’s framework, we investigate the collaborative initiatives 
along three institutional mechanisms, coercive, normative and mimetic to evaluate their 
potential to change the dominant conventions that prevail over financial market agents’ 
decision making processes.  
The first part of the paper presents the theoretical framework. It introduces the role of 
collective beliefs in stock valuation and investment processes and develops the process and 
mechanisms of institutionalization. The second part presents the data analysis. We first look at 
the emergence of ESG integration and then explore the new collaborative initiatives. Finally, a 
concluding section discusses the results and the implications of our research.  
 
2. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
There are many theoretical perspectives explaining the use of information in financial 
markets for evaluation and investment purposes. On the one hand, modern portfolio theory 
assumes that investors are fully rational agents. According to efficient market hypothesis, 
there would be true, objective, and universal economic model underlying the price formation 
process. A new body of literature challenges this assertion and posits that it might be more 
realistic to consider the way in which investors inter-relate to each other and the link between 
investor behaviour, information and market returns. Part of what drives investor decision 
making when viewed through this lens is their pre-emption assessment of the way others will 
react to new information, “taking into account what average opinion expects the average 
opinion to be” [Keynes, 1936]. This approach suggests that investors faced with uncertainty 
converge towards a conventional model by adopting a mimetic behaviour. Therefore, they 
coordinate each other on “collective beliefs” [Orléan 2004, 2005].  
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After reviewing the different perspectives explaining the use of information in 
financial markets for evaluation and investment purposes, we introduce the theoretical 
framework based in institutional theory which will help us to evaluate the impact of the 
collaborative initiatives in changing dominant conventions.  
 
2.1. The role of collective beliefs in stock valuation and investment processes 
Modern portfolio theory assumes that investors are fully rational agents who can 
compute prices for all possible exogenous fundamental news. Equilibrium prices then result 
from a bottom-up aggregation of private investment values into market values. In this 
framework, investors immediately and correctly process all available information thus 
validating the Rational Expectation Hypothesis (REH) and subsequently the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis (EMH), [Fama, 1965; 1970].  
Nevertheless, these hypotheses are clearly questionable because information is often 
difficult to interpret. Rational expectations easily break down in real life if agents lack 
computing power to interpret the tremendous flow of information impacting stock markets.  
The neo-classical theoretical framework has been challenged from a number of 
different perspectives, although an alternative holistic theory has yet to overturn its 
conclusions. Some researchers have documented fundamental and technical anomalies that 
might come from the imperfect substitution of assets, information asymmetries, and presence 
of noise traders or rational bubbles. However, even if the standard theory has failed to resolve 
“paradoxes” like information revelation of Rational Expectation Equilibrium (REE) or use of 
resources for the production of information [Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980], standard academic 
research claims that it does not invalidate Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) and Rational 
Expectation Hypothesis (REH). Proponents of the EMH, such as Fama (1998), contend that as 
long as fund managers fail to systematically ‘beat-the-market’ over the long-term, the notion 
of market efficiency cannot be rejected.  
Behaviourists have challenged this view by arguing that there are also irrational 
investors that are unable to determine the correct prices which can trigger temporary market 
inefficiencies [Shleifer, 2000]. Others argue more strongly that over time, economic agents 
are not able to learn what the process of determining a variable is; thus, they cannot use this 
knowledge to form rational expectations [Kurz, 1999]. On the contrary, each agent builds his 
own theory of the future and the distribution of the resulting private models of the economy 
constitutes “a social state of belief”.  
 7 
 
Variations in the distribution of beliefs can cause volatility changes that are 
uncorrelated with fundamental information. These volatility changes, in turn, are the result of 
correlation in beliefs among investors who are influenced by reading the same newspapers 
and the same reports of the Wall Street analysts for instance. In this framework, price 
volatility observed on financial markets can be explained by endogenous changes of the 
structural link between private (primary) beliefs. 
An alternative way to understand the role of beliefs in information processing is to 
consider that investors faced with uncertainty have to reach a coordination game, based on 
collective representations of the economy and react to new information in reference to these 
common beliefs [Orléan 2004, 2005].  This coordination game then consists in guessing the 
way other investors will react to news (knowing that others themselves adopt the same 
behaviour). To coordinate each other, investors have then to converge towards a conventional 
model by adopting a mimetic behaviour. Among other mechanisms, the « salient point » 
concept [Schelling, 1960] is proposed to explain how such conventional model (a “collective 
belief”) can emerge .  
Collective beliefs are drastically different from individual (or private) beliefs, which 
concern what each individual thinks about the intrinsic significance of a certain proposition P 
(for example, “ESG information is relevant for long term stock valuation”). In our 
conventional model framework, a proposition P is a collective belief if each individual of a 
group G believes that, in the majority, the members of the group believe that P is true. This 
definition of collective beliefs is deemed in Orléan [2004] as “self referential” because it does 
not involve any reference to the primary beliefs of agents. It is also very different from a 
(simple) shared belief as each individual has to guess what the majority of the members of the 
group think the collective belief is . Thus, breaking away from the classical individualist 
model that views collective representation as the sum of individual opinions, this mechanism 
leads to the building of a self-governing/self-reinforcing social belief potentially disconnected 
from the primary beliefs of the agents. In this perspective, stock prices can be viewed as the 
result of “social conventions”.   
Analysis of institutional investors’ behaviour indicates that a number of investment 
practices are ‘conventional’ meaning that they are recognised and accepted by all. For 
example, practices such as stock valuation models used by financial analysts (such as 
discounted cash flow models) or standard mean-variance portfolio optimisation are generally 
accepted and implemented by investment agents.  
 8 
 
They are regarded as conventional practices. As mentioned in Boyer and Orléan 
[1992], once a convention is established, no agent has any incentive to deviate from it. 
Moreover, the convention is self-sustaining as each agent will behave in a certain way on the 
expectation that others will also behave in that way. Thus, the perceived risks of making 
decisions under uncertainty are diffused as investors seek behavioural conformity which 
constrain and influence their behaviour.  
The dominant collective beliefs often obstruct the adoption of a new practice, in the 
context of this paper, eg. the integration of ESG information. In other words, established 
conventions generally impede (or slow down) the emergence of new ones. The research 
conducted by Guyatt [2005, 2006a] shows that dominant (external and internal) conventions 
could impede fund managers ability to integrate ESG information into investment decisions. 
External conventions relate to collective behaviour that prevails across the market, while 
internal conventions refer to conditions that are particular to an investment organisation (like 
the internal team structure, culture, incentive system and attitude towards SRI). This research 
found that short-termism and gravitation towards defensible investment decisions constitute 
the main behavioural impediment to the integration of ESG dimensions by institutional 
investors. This finding was corroborated by recent studies [BSR, 2008, McKinsey, 2009]. 
According to these surveys, some investors and analysts recognize that ESG factors can 
impact financial performance, however they judge the potential risks generated and value 
created too long-term compared to their investment horizon. 
One of the other dominant and recurring themes that emerged from this research is the 
narrow company valuation model that has become widely adopted across the investment 
community. Indeed, analysis of institutional investors’ behaviour indicates that a number of 
investment practices are ‘conventional’ meaning that they are recognised and accepted by all. 
Indeed, it has become standard practice for estimates of company valuations to over-
emphasise the importance of tangible, financial criteria to derive the net present value of a 
stock’s expected income stream, such that cash flow return on investment can be estimated. A 
study on Swedish investors by Hellman [2000] found that in making such estimates, close 
attention is paid to financial ratios such as return on equity, return on capital employed, sales 
growth, price/earnings ratios and technical/momentum indicators. The integration of ‘other’ 
intangible factors is often overlooked in this valuation process and a narrow framing of the 
valuation criteria is not only conventional at the ‘external’ market level, but is also ingrained 
within the ‘internal’ conventions and processes that prevail within investment institutions.  
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Actually, many investment professionals point out the difficulty inherent in translating 
ESG information into monetary terms. According to many surveys about the attitude of 
mainstream financial investors toward ESG information, the lack of universally accepted 
methods for quantifying extra-financial information is one of the major impediments against 
the integration of ESG information [Guyatt, 2006a,b,  Jaworski, 2007, BSR, 2008, McKinsey, 
2009]. 
Among the other impediments highlighted by these studies, the dissatisfaction of 
investment professionals with the ESG information disclosed: available information is not 
sufficient/ appropriate to enable effective assessment of ESG issues also impedes the 
integration of such information [Jaworski, 2007; BSR, 2008; McKinsey, 2009]. However, the 
most important barrier against the integration of ESG information by mainstream financial 
community is the scepticism about the link between ESG factors and financial performance.  
Many mainstream financial analysts and fund managers are still unconvinced about the 
impact of ESG issues on stock value [Jaworski, 2007; BSR, 2008] . Indeed, there is no 
consensus about the relationship between ESG performance and stock value within both 
professional and academic communities [Orlitzky et al. 2003, Jemel, 2008]. 
However, we believe that the main barrier that impedes an effective integration of 
ESG information is the absence of a collective belief about their recognized relevance for 
long-term investment returns across the financial community. The absence of such a collective 
belief obstructs the emergence of new methodologies and perspectives of evaluating 
companies and making investment decisions, thus impeding the mainstreaming of ESG 
integration. Similarly, the development of a collective belief is influenced by the practices and 
efforts dispersed by the financial community representatives over time. In other words, there 
is a mutual reinforcement between the evolution of practices and the evolution of collective 
beliefs. Figure 1 provides a representation of the mutual reinforcement loop described above. 
Insert Figure 1 About Here 
According to Guyatt [2006a], since the industry is by nature conservative and mindful 
of fiduciary obligations to beneficiaries, a slow process of change is more likely than an 
abrupt change of existing practices. We argue that the change is more likely to happen 
through a long process of institutionalisation that will lead to a redefine or reshape the 
dominant conventions.  
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2.2. Process and mechanisms of institutionalisation 
Zucker [1977] asserts that “institutionalisation is both a process and a property 
variable. It is the process by which individual actors transmit what is socially defined as real 
and, at the same time, at any point in the process the meaning of an act can be defined as more 
or less a taken-for-granted part of this social reality. Institutionalised acts, then, must be 
perceived as both objective and exterior” [Zucker, 1977]. So institutionalisation is viewed as 
the social process by which individuals come to accept a shared definition of social reality. It 
operates to produce common understandings about what is appropriate and, fundamentally, 
meaningful behaviour [Zucker, 1983]. “Institutionalisation involves the processes by which 
social processes, obligations, or actualities come to take on a rule like status in social thought 
and action” [Meyer & Rowan, 1977].  
According to DiMaggio and Powell [1983] the process of institutionalisation is 
characterised by four elements that are recognisable in any institutionalised field [DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983]:  
 
1. An increase in interaction among organisations within a given field;  
2. The development of inter-organisational structures of control and relational patterns;  
3. An increase in the amount of information that organisations within the field must 
process; and,  
4. The development of mutual awareness by members of the organizational field.  
 
By organizational filed, DiMaggio and Powell [1983] mean “those organizations that, 
in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life”. This addresses attention 
“not simply to competing firms” but “to the totality of relevant actors”. Through the process 
of institutionalisation, fields become highly structured. This process serves to stabilise and 
make interactions between participants become routine by integrating them within the 
structure of the field. As a consequence, organisations within a highly structured field exhibit 
convergence towards normative practices, thereby lessening the diversity of practices and 
organisational forms within the field. As a result, in the long term, organisations tend to adopt 
similar and homogenous practices.  
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Institutional theorists consider organizational environments as the sources of norms 
and values that, over time, impregnate organizations and influence their practices. Within an 
organizational field, organisations tend to resemble one another. In response to direct or 
indirect, intentional or unintentional pressures, they develop similar practices. According to 
DiMaggio and Powell [1983] the pressures can be categorised in three types: coercive, 
mimetic; and normative influences.  
Coercive forces stem from political influence and problems of legitimacy. They 
consist of the external pressures formally or informally exerted on organizations by other 
organizations upon which they are dependant. Such pressures can arise from government, 
regulatory agencies or other actors on which the organizations depend for resources. These 
pressures may be felt as force, as persuasion, or as invitation to join in collusion [DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983, p.150]. In some cases, constraints come from government mandate and 
regulations (environmental regulations) and in others they can occur outside the governmental 
arena.  Indeed, coercive pressures can result from exchange relationships such as relationships 
between business partners. The greater is the dependence of an organization on another one, 
the more likely the dependant organization is to conform to the imposed rules. 
Mimetic changes result from standard responses to uncertainty. When organizations 
face uncertainty, they are inclined to model themselves on other organizations and to imitate 
their activities, systems, or structures. Conditions of uncertainty can be linked to 
misunderstanding of a technology, ambiguous goals or doubt about cause-and-effect 
relationships between variables. Under uncertainty, such imitation may be undertaken without 
any clear evidence of performance improvements. As a result, organizations tend to adopt 
practices of their peers that they perceive to be more legitimate or successful. “Models may be 
diffused unintentionally, indirectly through employee transfer or turnover, or explicitly by 
organizations such as consulting firms or industry trade associations” [DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983, p.151]. 
Normative influences stem primarily from professionalization interpreted by 
[DiMaggio and Powell, 1983].  As “the collective struggle of members of an occupation to 
define the conditions and methods of their work”. Normative forces represent the professional 
standards resulting from the pressures exerted by professional groupings on organizations to 
adopt behaviours and practices considered to be relevant and legitimate. Two main vehicles 
for the definition and promulgation of normative rules are identified by the authors: 
universities and professional training institutions; and professional and trade associations.  
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The first are an important source of development of norms through education and 
academic production, while the second represent a powerful mean for diffusing new standards 
and models through networks that span organizations. In fact, socialization and exchanges of 
information among professionals help contribute to the definition of a common knowledge. 
Other vehicles for professional norms can be for example consultancies, trade magazines, or 
workshops.  
The three institutional mechanisms create a certain dynamic that can change a 
convention. The mechanisms take place at the macro level; that is at the organisational field 
level. The identification of these mechanisms is very important in understanding the type of 
pressures that can support change. However they are somehow rather general and do not 
capture the dynamics of change, which is what we want to explore in this paper. Therefore we 
need to go to the micro-level to outline the dynamics. In other words, we want to understand 
the micro-activities that contribute to the institutionalization process and link them to the 
institutional mechanisms as defined by DiMaggio and Powell, [1983]. Scott [1994, 1995] 
insists on the need to address more micro-level explanations into institutional theory. Indeed, 
there is little empirical work that deals with a micro-level in the study of institutional 
processes. As [DiMaggio and Powell, 1991] notice: 'Most institutionalists prefer to focus on 
the structural environments, macro to micro-level effects, and the analytic autonomy of macro 
structures'. 
 
2.3. The theoretical framework 
Our theoretical framework presents three levels as represented in Figure  2. The first 
level focuses on micro-level. Actors have developed a number of micro-level actions that 
contribute to the second level, the coercive, normative or mimetic mechanisms suggested by 
DiMaggio and Powell [1983]. We argue that the cumulation of micro activities can help to 
legitimize ESG integration and thereby contribute to the change process of the dominant 
convention, the third level. The institutional mechanisms are useful to describe an institutional 
process but also “to predict empirically” the emergence and the diffusion of new norms and 
standards among an organizational field [DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p.154]. The three 
levels are in constant interactions.  
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Insert Figure 2 About Here 
3. DATA ANALYSIS 
3.1. Methodology 
The empirical work consists of an exploratory research based on semi-structured 
interviews and secondary data.   
25 face to face semi-structured interviews were conducted between July 2007 April 
2009 with financial and extra-financial analysts and fund managers in France. Sell-side 
financial analysts are employed by brokerage firms, their research and recommendations are 
distributed to their investor clients. Buy-side analysts are employed by institutional investors, 
their research and recommendations are intended for the sole use of their company’s portfolio 
managers. Often, buy-side analysts use the research provided by sell-side analysts to evaluate 
companies. The analytical processes of buy-side and sell-side analysts are not very different. 
Table 1 gives an overview of the interviews. The main objective was to identify the 
main initiatives and levers that encourage the integration of ESG information and assess their 
potential to become integrated by the mainstream investment community. 
Insert Table 1 About Here 
Sell-side financial analysts are employed by brokerage firms, their research and 
recommendations are distributed to their investor clients. Buy-side analysts are employed by 
institutional investors, their research and recommendations are intended for the sole use of 
their company’s portfolio managers. Often, buy-side analysts use the research provided by 
sell-side analysts to evaluate companies. The analytical processes of buy-side and sell-side 
analysts are not very different. 
In addition to the interviews, we collected information on the different initiatives 
through internet websites, surveys, reports and press publications. The rational was to gather 
the maximum of information about the initiatives in order to analyze their potential to 
influence investment practices.. 
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Empirical data collected are qualitative data. In order to capture the essence of the 
data, analyze and interpret them, we followed Miles and Huberman [1984] approach 
consisting in data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing/verification [Miles & 
Huberman, 1984]. The interviews were analyzed by using the qualitative the qualitative data 
analysis software program QSR NVivo was used to facilitate the analysis of the interviews.  
Based on the data collected, we can retrace the emerging dynamics that seek to 
mainstream the integration of ESG information into investment decision processes.  
 
3.2. ESG integration: an overview of an emerging trend 
Responsible investors have been the precursor in using ESG information in investment 
decisions. The growing attention to ESG issues across the more traditional investment 
community is considered as the mainstreaming of SRI. However, it is important to note that 
the integration of ESG information by mainstream investment companies is a fundamentally 
different approach than SRI. While SRI derives from moral and ethical concerns, the new 
trend of integration of ESG information by mainstream investors is motivated by purely 
financial considerations.  
In fact, the historical roots of SRI are closely connected to faith based organizations. 
The first SRI practices were initiated by church organizations that didn’t want to support or be 
associated with certain activities or companies [Kinder, Lydenberg, & Domini, 1994; Kinder 
& Domini, 1997; Kreander, Molyneaux, & McPhail, 2003; Sparkes, 1995]. They have 
developed a negative screening strategy of investments consisting in avoiding the so-called 
‘sin’ stock usually referring to alcohol, tobacco, gambling and weapons. One of the 
emblematic and first SRI mutual funds was the Pioneer fund set up in 1928 in the U.S. to meet 
church institutions’ needs. In the 1970s-80s SRI moved to a new phase, shifting from a moral 
and ethical logic to a more activist logic embedded into the political and protest movements of 
the day . This period marks the beginnings of SRI in the contemporary sense of the term. It 
then began a gradual transition to a less confrontational approach to expand towards the 
mainstream financial community . At its beginning, this expansion has consisted in the 
development of SRI funds within traditional investment institutions. Gradually, SRI research 
has flourished inside investment houses and independent research providers to support 
professional investors in their decision process according to the investment strategy adopted .  
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On the other hand, the idea of including ESG aspects into mainstream investment has 
emerged just recently within analysts and fund managers. The first claims and practices linked 
to the integration of ESG information into mainstream investment decision making appeared 
publicly at the beginning of 2001. It was isolated projects launched by some pioneers 
convinced that ESG analysis can help asset managers and financial analysts to better assess 
the risks and seize the opportunities for companies. Nonetheless, in a short time period, the 
integration of ESG information into mainstream investment decision-making has created a 
growing attention within the financial community; and many other initiatives have emerged to 
encourage traditional institutional investors and research providers to consider ESG issues. 
The paragraphs below, try to summarize the main indicators of the increasing trend of ESG 
integration by the mainstream financial community.   
 
• ESG research providers’ development 
Historically ESG research activity has been linked to SRI. Indeed, the main target of 
the first research providers focusing on ethical, social and environmental issues was the 
responsible investors -in particular, institutional investors. Following the increasing demand 
for SRI in the late 1980’s, a number of research organizations have sprung up to serve the 
growing need for data to implement SRI strategies and tactics. During the 1990’s, an 
increasing number of independent SRI research organizations were created to provide 
institutional investors with background data on the ethical, social and environmental records 
of a sample of publicly traded companies. Besides these independent organizations, many 
research teams have been developed inside investment management houses to support asset 
managers to manage SRI funds. These SRI teams remained however obviously totally 
separated from the mainstream financial analysts and fund managers. In fact, as noted by 
Louche [2004], when SRI is part of a mainstream financial institution, it often remains an 
island in its own organization: there is no or limited communication between the SRI 
community and financial analysts. 
At the beginnings of 2000, the research on environmental, social and governance 
issues crossed a new stage with the creation of the first ESG research teams inside brokerage 
houses. In fact, the development of ESG research teams within sell-side companies 
symbolizes the first concrete steps towards the mainstreaming of ESG information integration. 
In November 2001, HSBC was the first sell-side brokerage firm in Europe, and the second in 
the world , to offer ESG research.   
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The creation of such a team within a major sell-side broker constituted a shift for ESG 
research as sell-side brokers do not target only responsible investors but the whole investment 
universe. Indeed, these teams were created with the objective of broadening the scope of ESG 
information from a marginal to a global use. Since 2001, the number of ESG research 
providers targeting mainstream investors has registered an important growth. As we can see in 
figure 1, the increase was accelerated markedly around 2005. This acceleration probably 
results from the activity created by some influential professional initiatives, in particular the 
Enhanced Analytics Initiatives.  
 
• Institutional investors’ collaborations   
 
The ESG integration has rapidly moved from scattered initiatives to organized joint 
programmes. Among the most influential professional collaborations developed with the 
objective of promoting the integration of ESG information into mainstream research are the 
Enhanced Analytics Initiative (EAI) and the Principles of Responsible Initiatives (PRI). 
The EAI “is an international collaboration between asset owners and asset managers 
aimed at encouraging better investment research, in particular research that takes account of 
the impact of extra-financial issues on long-term investment” [EAI, 2007]. The EAI was 
launched at the end of 2003 by a founding group composed of 7 institutional investors  
managing some 364 billion in assets. Today, EAI has 27 members and represents total Assets 
under management of more than 1,8 trillion Euros. To encourage sell-side analysts to produce 
ESG research, EAI members have agreed to allocate at minimum five percent of their 
respective brokerage commissions to the brokers providing the best analysis of extra-financial 
issues. In this perspective, EAI commissioned a consulting company to evaluate twice a year 
the research submitted by the different research providers and to rank the best ones. Some 
years later, the bet seems to have paid off, as the number of ESG research providers has 
registered a significant growth since EAI was launched. In fact, figure 3 below shows that the 
number of ESG research providers increased from 8 in December 2003 (launch of EAI) to 33 




Insert Figure 3 About Here 
The PRI were launched in April 2006 by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in 
collaboration with 20 major institutional investors. The initiative consists of six principles that 
provide a framework to incorporate ESG issues into mainstream investment decision-making 
and ownership practices (See Appendix 1). The six principles are not prescriptive, the 
signatories publicly commit to adopt and implement them, where consistent with their 
fiduciary responsibilities. By 2009, the PRI had grown into a coalition of more than 400 of the 
largest institutional investors and asset managers worldwide representing some $15 trillion 
dollars under management [Hobbs, 2008].  
Recently (end of 2008), the PRI and the EAI announced their merger under the PRI 
name. Their alliance is aiming at supporting the generalization of ESG research and the 
effective inclusion of ESG information into investment decision practices: “this new approach 
will represent a single, powerful voice within international investment markets, continuing to 
encourage the production of better integrated and longer term research” [PRI, 2008]. This 
decision will necessitate changes to the existing EAI process, however, the new entity assures 
research providers that they will continue to support those producing high-quality ESG 
research through the allocation of commissions. 
The Investor Network on Climate Risk (INCR) represents another important initiative. 
INCR is a network of institutional investors and financial institutions that promotes better 
understanding of the financial risks and investment opportunities posed by climate change.  
INCR is coordinated by Ceres, a coalition of investors and environmental groups working to 
advance sustainable prosperity. 
 
• Financial analysts’ collaborations 
The financial analysts’ community has also witnessed the emergence of professional 
collaborations addressing the inclusion of ESG information. In France for example, some 
members of the SFAF, the French association of financial analysts, founded in 2002 a 
commission to discuss and exchange ideas about the analysis of sustainable development 
information and to increase investment community awareness of the importance of this issue.  
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At a European level, the EFFAS CESG (European Federation of Financial Analysts 
(EFFAS) Commission on ESG Environmental, Social & Governance (CESG)) was founded in 
October 2007 with the objective of “Facilitating the integration of ESG aspects of corporate 
performance into investment processes”.  
 
• Other professional initiatives 
 
Many consultancy companies have positioned themselves in the emerging market of 
services related to ESG information and financial advice. Some of them rely on their skills in 
financial investment domains to propose new services combining ESG issues analysis and 
investment advice. The British consulting company Mercer is among the pioneer investment 
consulting firm that developed such new services. Its newly-created division specializing in 
responsible investment is progressively striving for the extension of its services to mainstream 
investors. Indeed, in 2007 Mercer created the PRI Implementation Service, including the 
monitoring of ESG factors within investment at fund managers [Responsible Investors, 2008]. 
And in 2008, Mercer announced its intention to rate all fund managers on their strategic 
responses to environmental, social and governance concerns. This information is added to its 
global database listing the characteristics of funds managers on which investors base their 
choice for the appropriate fund or asset manager.  
Several others consultancy companies have also launched services to help investors to 
develop investment approaches that integrate ESG issues within a fiduciary framework (See 
Appendix 2). 
 
• Surveys, reports and publications 
The number of reports, articles and surveys published the last years about ESG 
information, usefulness to the financial community and ESG integration into investment 
decisions, represent another indicator of the growing interest in these issues.  
The EABIS/European CSR Alliance research project , ‘Valuing Business’ [Amaeshi 
2009] has identified 82 reports from accounting firms, investor associations, business 
coalitions, investment banks, multinational institutions, consultancies and think tanks, 
governments and multi-stakeholder fora published between 2000 and March 2009 (see Figure 
4, EABIS/EU Laboratory, 2009). Although this list is not exhaustive it provides a good 
indication of the most significant and used reports and of the increasing number of reports on 
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the topic. It is also interesting to note that about 50% of the reports have been produced by 
multinationals, multi-stakeholder coalitions, Accounting firms and think tanks. 
Insert Figure 4 About Here 
Similarly, the specialized press has shown a greater interest in the inclusion of ESG 
issues in investment practices. A search in the Financial Times, Wall Street Journal and the 
Australian Financial review reveals a significant increase of articles published on the topic 
since 2006-2007. “Environmental, social and governance as key words” were used as key 
words.  
 
3.3. Micro-level actions aiming at institutionalize ESG integration 
The preceding section retracing the genesis of ESG integration shows reveals that 
there is an apparent willingness from many actors to mainstream the integration of ESG 
information into investment decision-making. In this next section, we analyze the emerging 
collaborative initiatives in the light of the three institutional mechanisms, coercive, normative 
and mimetic. It is however important to note that the three types of mechanisms defined are 
not always empirically distinct. Indeed, within the identified micro-level actions, some can 
contribute to one or several mechanisms. For example, efforts implemented by EAI members 
can be considered both as micro-level action supporting coercive mechanisms and mimetic 
mechanisms.  
 
3.3.1. Micro-level actions supporting coercive mechanisms 
We have identified two main actors who have developed micro-level actions exerting 
coercive pressures on the financial community, namely institutional investors especially 
pension funds, and governments.  
Institutional investors are essentially exercising pressures through contractual 
restrictions. Fund managers and sell-side financial analysts may be contractually required by 
the institutional investors to integrate ESG issues in the management mandate. Such 
requirements constrains fund managers and financial analysts to consider ESG information. 
Indeed, over the last ten years, many institutional investors have launched calls for tenders for 
bond and equity mandates including such a restriction.  
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As a result, many fund managers have agreed to implement the necessary measures to 
meet the requirements and win the mandate. Indeed, such calls for tenders issued by major 
institutional investors as for example the FRR  in France have contributed to the development 
of extra-financial research within investment companies.  
 
“We were not opposed to introduce social aspects in our investment strategy but it 
was not our priority. It was a potential project. We had had already discussed several 
times about the creation of an SRI team and the launch of an SRI or a thematic fund 
but it was not a short time project... Let’s say that the FRR mandate helped us to 
accelerate its implementation... yes, it was important for us to win this mandate” 
[Fund manager].  
 
In France, the call for tenders launched by the FRR’s and the EARP  between 2004 
and 2007 has served as a catalyst for change. Although it has not led to an effective 
integration, it has contributed to the increased interest of the mainstream investment 
community in ESG information. It was an explicit objective of the calls as Nada Villermain 
Lecollier, head of responsible investment at FRR, confirmed in an interview published in 
Responsible Investor in 2008 :   
 
“It’s a strategy that’s worked well, even if it was ambitious. We haven’t imposed any 
method of ESG research onto our managers; we’ve just be directional. [...] In our 
mandates, we say that we are attentive to ESG integration over the lifetime of the 
mandate. [...] Part of our identity is to get our managers to integrate ESG into their 
investment. It’s hard-wired into the mandates”. He also adds: “We don’t say that from 
one day to the next we want to see results, but we do question the managers regularly 
on what they are doing”. 
 
Norwegian and Sweden pension funds were among the first to launch tenders to bring 
asset managers to include ESG issues. This has probably been stimulated by the UN PRI 
which has been endorsed actively and at an early stage by Denmark, Norway and Sweden  
[Pension News, Oct 7th, 2008 ]. Similarly, an increasing number of UK institutional investors 
have adopted this strategy.  
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The April 2009 Fair Pension’s report has pointed out a “trend among large UK 
pension schemes to be more assertive with fund managers about their responsible investment 
credentials, notably when hiring for investment mandates ”.  
The mandate requirement can be different from mandate to mandate. It may involve 
the implementation of a specific criterion regarding one or more ESG aspects, a strategy of 
shareholder engagement, and/or excluding certain sectors or activities. For example, the 
tender launched in December 2007 by the UK Environment Agency’s Pension Fund specified 
that it would favour managers according to investment in climate change themes as well as 
adherence to the UNPRI  [Responsible Investor, 8 September 2008]. Similarly, London 
Pension Fund Authority (LPFA) said it “would no longer hire fund managers that failed to 
comply with certain criteria on ethical, social and governance issues, including those that do 
not sign up to the UN Principles for Responsible Investment”[Responsible Investor, 2008] . 
The Government Pension Fund of Norway is another example of using a combination of 
engagement, negative screening, and exclusion. Companies can be excluded from the 
investment portfolio when violating human rights, the environment or involved in corruption. 
This has led to the June 2006 Wal-Mart case. Because of labour right violation suspicions, the 
Norwegian Government Pension Fund decided to divest from the company. They held at that 
time stocks of about US$ 430 million. This event had large media coverage. Other groups of 
investors give priority to engagement and shareholders activism. For example, in its 
December 2008 investment mandate, the fund of NILGOSC (Northern Ireland Local 
Government Officers’ Superannuation Committee) required an engagement strategy.  
These micro-level actions implemented by institutional investors are considered as 
coercive pressures. They are developed in a context of dependency and power inequality. 
Asset managers are very often dependant on large institutional investors such as the pension 
funds. Institutional investors are their most important clients in terms of assets under 
management. With assets of approximately €270 billion (as of December 31, 2007), the 
Norwegian Government Pension Fund-Global is the largest pension fund in Europe and the 
second largest pension fund in the world [Eurosif, 2008]. In France the FRR and ERAFP 
represent about 38bn euro of assets under management. As an increasing number of these 
major investors are considering ESG integration, fund managers are constrained to accept 
their conditions to survive. 
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Another source of coercive pressures that target research providers, in particular sell-
side financial analysts, is the EAI. Obviously, EAI’s objective is to push mainstream financial 
analysts to cover ESG information by proving to them that 1) investors are interested in ESG 
analysis and 2) institutional investors are prepared to pay for it. As EAI represents an 
important coalition of institutional investors, its pressures can be felt as a constraint.  Indeed, 
this professional collaboration is constituted of major institutional investors in the world 
representing a total Assets under management of more than 1,8 trillion Euros. As highlighted 
by one of its founding members in an article published in 2004 in Social Funds , EAI 
members’ goal was to create the necessary context to push brokers to produce ESG research:  
 
"The founding members recognized that there was a chicken and egg situation: sell-
side analysts currently do not routinely provide analysis of extra-financial issues in 
their reports and their clients, the fund managers, do not ask for it. […] The fund 
managers do not ask for it [because] they are often unaware of the implications that 
these issues could have on the companies in which they invest. […]. By providing the 
financial and business case for the sell-side to incorporate these issues, the EAI will 
break this negative cycle". 
 
Coercive pressure is also coming from regulations initiated by governments. Over the 
last decade, many governments have launched new regulations to establish ESG disclosure 
requirements for pension funds. According to research published by SHARE (Shareholder 
Association for Research & Education) in 2008. The first jurisdiction to establish a formal 
obligation for pension fund ESG disclosure was the United Kingdom in 2000. Indeed, since 
July 2000 the trustees of an occupational pension fund are required to declare "the extent (if at 
all) to which social, environmental or ethical considerations are taken into account in the 
selection, retention and realization of investments” and “the policy (if any) directing the 
exercise of the rights (including voting rights) attaching to investments" . Following this 
pioneer initiative, many other governments put similar rules in place. Figure 5 below 







Insert Figure 5 About Here 
3.3.2. Micro-level actions supporting mimetic mechanisms 
Many sources of uncertainty surround the domain of ESG information. As discussed 
above, the main uncertainties stem from the lack of clear evidences on 1) the impact of ESG 
aspects on companies’ financial performance and 2) the relevant methods to quantify these 
impacts [Guyatt, 2006a,b,  Jaworski, 2007, BSR, 2008, McKinsey, 2009]. As a response, 
actors within the financial community have developed several micro-level actions.  
One of them is the creation of professional collaboration networks about ESG 
information such as EFFAS CESG or CERES . The main objective of these initiatives is to 
facilitate the sharing of knowledge, methodologies and expertise among the investment 
community: “CESG will not confine itself to discussions but rather strive to define positions 
on extra-financials, produce outcomes such as papers, recommendations and seek to play an 
active role in the dialogue with both investment professionals and corporates” [EFFAS,2008] .  
Consulting firms, being viewed as experts, are also playing a role by diffusing models. 
Consultants develop relationships with numerous organisations to which they deliver similar 
advice. In addition, their multiple interventions in these organizations allow them to pick out 
best practices and to transfer them from one organization to another. Likewise, the production 
and diffusion of reports and studies by consulting companies and research centres help the 
transfer of ideas and methods. Indeed, as many issues regarding ESG information are 
surrounded by uncertainties, many organizations tend to get solutions and innovative practices 
suggested by experts. For example, in June 2006 the consultancy Trucost published a study on 
the correlation between CO2 emissions and financial performance in the United Kingdom. 
The same year, Yachnin & Associates published a report in which concrete examples were 
given to illustrate methodologies that allow quantifying and isolating the effect of corporate 
sustainable development practices on share price performance. Such advices and ideas 
represent a vehicle for the diffusion of norms and standards that help actors to reduce 
uncertainties and to coordinate their actions. 
EAI can also be considered as a vehicle of mimetic behaviours. By advocating the 
importance of including ESG information into investment decisions, EAI members influence 




In fact, through their initiative, EAI members indirectly influence their peers in the 
investment sector by demonstrating their own interest to ESG information and by making 
ESG research available to asset managers and then potentially considered by them. Another 
interesting development has been the launch of several of the EAI’s bi-annual rankings since 
2004. The EAI rankings have had a significant impact on sell-side companies to create a 
devoted ESG research team. First, because, they wanted to be among the pioneers providing 
extra-financial research and second because the nominated companies are rewarded through 
the financial commissions allocated by EAI members. This was confirmed in the interviews 
conducted with sell-side analysts working in brokerage houses. Being on those rankings was 
important to them: 
 
  “to appear among the brokerage companies able to adapt quickly their competencies 
and services in response to changing market demand”;  
 
and “to take advantage of the resources that derive from these activities” [sell-side 
analyst].  
 
Rankings and rewards regarding ESG research providers seem to have gained interest 
as many of them have been established in the last few years such as the Thomson Extel Social 
Responsible Investment Survey (in 2003) and the ESG Leaders Awards (in 2007). These 
ranking and awards contribute by highlighting the efforts undertaken by the financial 
professionals in the domain of ESG integration. By putting them in the spotlight, they 
encourage many others to join the movement.  
A last factor contributing to mimetic behaviour is employee transfer. Many financial 
analysts have moved from one company to another over recent years. For example, in order to 
launch its extra-financial research activity in 2004, Citigroup hired the analyst who founded 
the ESG research team in HSBC. In the same way, Société Générale recruited two senior ESG 
analysts from CM CIC to initiate its ESG research activity in 2004. Those transfers are 
helping the diffusion of models among different organisations because individuals come with 
methods and practices developed in their original employer and tend to replicate them in the 
new company.  
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3.3.3. Micro-level actions supporting normative mechanisms 
As the integration of extra-financial information into investment processes is a 
relatively new practice, many efforts have been undertaken to organize the field.  
Some members decided to collaborate in order to define the “profession” and the 
acceptable methods of work in the field of responsible investment research providers. A good 
example is the creation of the AI CSRR (Association for Independent Corporate Sustainability 
and Responsibility Research). The three first missions defined by the association express its 
ambition of “developing and promoting high professional standards for organisations in the 
field” [AI CSRR, 2009]. These missions are:  
 
- “to defend and promote the interests of the independent CSRR sector;  
- to represent the CSRR sector – inside and outside Europe - to professional 
users, public authorities and the SRI community and the general public, by way 
of direct communication, open dialogue and transparency;  
- to develop, promote and maintain high professional standards, expertise and 
codes of conduct for the CSRR sector” .  
 
The AI CSRR has developed the first quality standard for corporate responsibility and 
SRI research and analysis. This standard named CSRR- QS 2.1 provides a general description 
of principles and requirements regarding the activities of the field of responsible research. It 
focuses mainly on the operational requirements of SRI-related products and services. 
Other normative micro-level actions also appear through the growth of professional 
initiatives based on knowledge produced by university specialists and legitimated through 
academic credentials. Several collaborations have been developed between professional 
associations and academic groups to promote research linking finance with social 
responsibility and sustainability issues. The creation of the French SIF Award is an example 
of such initiatives. This award was launched in 2005 in order to support academic research, 
still an emerging area in the domains of finance and sustainable development: “By building 
bridges between universities, stakeholders and the financial world, the Award aims to increase 
investigative research allowing for new and innovative management. The Award will also 
give value to French and European university research, as well as help promote Socially 
Responsible Investment (SRI)”.  
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In 2008, PRI representatives initiated the PRI Academic Network to consolidate and 
develop research in the domain of social responsibility and finance. It aims at “stimulating 
interest in responsible investment research and provides multiple avenues for greater 
interaction between academia and practitioners ”. Conferences and meetings are organized on 
a regular basis to encourage the production of innovative research able to help professionals 
and organizations to enhance their expertise.  The European Centre for Corporate Engagement 
(ECCE) is amongst the most active research centres that haves joined the PRI Academic 
Network. ECCE was founded in 2004 by researchers from Maastricht University and RSM 
Erasmus University in the Netherlands. It aims to help practitioners and scholars to 
“understand how businesses and financial markets can promote sustainable development by 
considering Environmental, Social and Corporate Governance (ESG) issues ”. In May 2009, 
an agreement was achieved between PRI and the Danish Government to promote academic 
research on responsible investment . Governmental support to such initiatives gives more 
weight to ESG integration & gives a significant signal to the financial community that these 
issues are more than a temporary trend. 
In February 2009, another similar initiative was launched in Australia. The Australian 
government announced $(Australian)2.5 million funding over three years to establish the 
Responsible Investment Academy. This Academy will be managed by the Responsible 
Investment Association Australasia (RIAA) and governed by an Australian and international 
Advisory Council. Its main goal is “to offer a range of premium Continuing Professional 
Development (CPD) courses as well as diploma and certificate courses ”. The implementation 
of a specific academic course is another way to establish and legitimate the area of responsible 
investment. 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper has investigated way new investor led collaborative initiatives are 
impacting on the integration of ESG information into mainstream investment processes and 
their potential to influence the standard valuation and investment practices of global fund 
managers. The results of this explorative study show that actors have developed a myriad of 
micro-level actions to stimulate the integration of ESG factors. The micro-level actions 
support and reinforce three institutional mechanisms: coercive, mimetic and normative which 
are vehicles through which the dominant collective belief may potentially evolve and change 
to integrate ESG information.  
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At this stage, it is difficult to predict if these micro-level actions will succeed to induce 
a change in the dominant collective belief. The strategies implemented are relatively recent 
while the diffusion and adoption of new conventional practices often necessitates a long time, 
especially within a conservative industry like the financial investment sector. 
This study is a first stage in the investigation of this emerging trend. It reveals that 
micro-level actions may play an important role in changing dominant conventional practices. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) have identified three mechanisms –coercive, mimetic and 
normative—that are very important in understanding the institutionalisation process. However 
they are somehow rather general and do not capture the dynamics of change. This analysis 
suggests that change of conventional practices is a complex and progressive process 
[Whashington and Ventresca, 2004] created through actions of, and interactions between, 
actors and involving a portfolio of micro-level actions that go on in combination and 
interrelation with each other.  
The micro-level actions described above are only illustrative and need to be further 
explored. They are of a different kind and nature, happening at different levels and different 
times. They do not necessarily occur independently; on the contrary they are combined and 
interwoven. They generate different outcomes but all contribute to the change in the dominant 
convention and thereby to the integration of ESG into mainstream investment. 
Future research would benefit from systematic empirical investigation of how multiple 
levels, from personal through community to national and international organisations, are 
implicated in whether and how individuals choose to take action (or not), both as individuals 
(private sphere behaviours, cf. Stern, 2000) and/or as members of networks such as 
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Appendix 1: The Principles of Responsible Investment (PRI) 
The six principles
1. We will incorporate ESG issues into investment analysis and decision-making 
processes. 
2. We will be active owners and incorporate ESG issues into our ownership policies and 
practices. 
3. We will seek appropriate disclosure on ESG issues by the entities in which we invest. 
4. We will promote acceptance and implementation of the Principles within the 
investment industry. 
5. We will work together to enhance our effectiveness in implementing the Principles. 





APPENDIX 2:  
Examples of investment consulting companies offering services related to ESG 
integration 
Creation Name Description Country 
2000 Trucost Plc 
An environmental research organisation that was established to 
help companies and investors understand the environmental 
impacts of business activities. Trucost provides data and analysis 
on company emissions and natural resource usage and presents 
these in financial as well as quantity terms. 
UK 
2002 onValues Ltd. 
A specialist investment consulting and research company.  Its 
distinguishing feature is a focus 
on investment strategies that take into consideration long-term 
value drivers, including  
environmental, social and governance issues. 
CH 
2003 ASSET4 Milestones 
A consulting company offering investment research information 
on the key economic, environmental, social and governance 
aspects of corporate performance that are material to the 







Mercer’s global Responsible Investment (RI) business unit 
provides advice to investment fiduciaries and practitioners on all 
aspects of RI. The RI business unit helps institutional investors to 
develop investment approaches that integrate environmental, 
social and corporate governance (ESG) issues within a fiduciary 
framework.   
Mercer is a leading global provider of investment consulting 
services, and offers customized guidance at every stage of 







A consulting group specialized in sustainable development and 
corporate social responsibility. Y&A is very active in helping 
integrate considerations of SD into investment decision-making 
and promoting related dialogue. 
CA 
2006 Sinclair & Company, LLC 
An investment advisory firm. We offer tailored investment 
consulting to institutional investors integrating environmental, 
social, and governance [ESG] factors into investment practice. 
Sinclair & Company helps investors and their clients understand 






Mutual reinforcement loop 
Tools and methods 
integrating ESG information 
(are not) are viable and (not) 
recognised (nor) and broadly 
diffused valuation models
Integration of ESG 
information (have not) 
have become part of the 
Dominant conventional 
investment
Relevance of ESG issues 
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Financial Analysts  SRI. Buy side 4 
  Sell side 5 
 Mainstream Buy side 4 
  Sell side 4 
Fund managers SRI  4 





Growth in reports and Research Providers since beginning of EAI Evaluations  
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